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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD OF ] 
UTAH, a nonprofit corporation, ] 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, UTAH STATE TAX j 
COMMISSION, and UTAH STATE ] 
INSURANCE DEPARTMENT, ] 
Defendants/Respondents. ] 
' Case No. 19676 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS/DEFENDANTS 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING 
Plaintiff and Appellant Blue Cross and Blue Shield of 
Utah (hereinafter referred to as "Utah Blue Cross" or "Blue 
Cross") challenges the constitutionality of the subscription 
income tax of Utah Code Ann. § 31-37-9(2) under the equal 
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. (All references to the Utah Code are to 
Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended.) Utah Blue Cross also 
challenges the statute under the Utah Constitution, Article I, 
Section 24, and Article VI, Section 26, as a violation of the 
requirement of "uniform operation of the laws" and as a "pri-
vate or special law." Utah Blue Cross seeks full refund of 
$1,674,614.09 paid to the Utah State Tax Commission since March 
24, 1982. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW 
Utah Blue Cross' motion for partial summary judgment 
was denied by the Honorable TIMOTHY R. HANSON, Judge, of the 
Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, on October 4, 1983. (R. 744-749.) Defendants and Re-
spondents (hereinafter referred to as "State" or "State of 
Utah") submitted a motion for summary judgment on November 10, 
1983. (R. 768-769.) After hearing arguments by respective 
counsel and having considered the memoranda of the parties and 
the record, the Honorable J. DENNIS FREDERICK, Judge, of the 
Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, granted the State's motion on December 6, 1983. (R. 
788-789.) Utah Blue Cross appeals. 
RELIEE SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The State seeks affirmance of the judgment and order 
of the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, in this matter. 
STATEMENT OE THE EACTS 
The Defendant, Utah State Tax Commission, is an 
agency of the State of Utah charged with the general supervi-
sion of the tax laws of the State of Utah. The Defendant, Utah 
Insurance Department, is an agency of the State of Utah charged 
with the execution of laws relating to insurers doing business 
in the State of Utah. 
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Blue Cross is a nonprofit health service corporation 
operating in the State of Utah in accordance with the terms and 
provisions of the Nonprofit Hospital, Medical-Surgical, Dental, 
and Health Service Corporation Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 31-37-1 
to -26. As such, Utah Blue Cross is authorized to make avail-
able to its subscribers all the services provided by hospitals 
or licensed health care institutions, and by licensed doctors 
and nurses. In addition, Utah Blue Cross is authorized to make 
drugs, medicine and other health services available to its 
subscribers. Utah Blue Cross is not allowed to provide any 
form of casualty or life insurance coverage to its subscribers. 
Utah Code Ann. § 31-37-15. All health service corporations 
organized pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 31-37-1 to -26 are 
subject to a tax of 2 1/4% on the subscription income they 
receive from the contracts covering risks in the State of Utah. 
Utah Code Ann. § 31-14-4(1). 
There are also present in the State a number of other 
types of insurance companies, including six associations organ-
ized as mutual benefit associations (hereinafter referred to as 
"MBAs") in accordance with the Mutual Benefit Association Act, 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 31-31-1 to -15. This Act was repealed by the 
legislature in 1969 Utah Laws, Chapter 74, Section 8. Since 
the repeal of the Mutual Benefit Association Act, the Commis-
sioner of Insurance may not issue licenses permitting companies 
to operate under the provisions of Chapter 31 of Title 31 of 
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the Insurance Code. MBAs in existence at the time of the repeal 
of the Act were specifically grandfathered by 1969 Utah Laws, 
Chapter 74, Section 8. Those mutual benefit associations still 
in existence were and continue to be organized for the purpose 
of providing benefits to members or beneficiaries of members. 
In accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 31-14-4(1), a tax 
similar to that imposed upon Utah Blue Cross is imposed upon 
"[e]very insurance company engaged in the transaction of busi-
ness in this state. . . . " Like Utah Blue Cross, insurance 
companies must pay a tax of 2 1/4% of total premiums they 
receive annually from insurance covering property or risks 
located in the State of Utah. The tax on premium income levied 
by Utah Code Ann. § 31-14-4(1) is not levied on "premiums on 
policies which have been or will be issued by domestic benefit 
[MBAs], or co-operative benefit associations." 
Other relevant facts and testimony that the State 
plans to utilize are incorporated in the argument. The 
State would like to point out that the section of the appel-
lant's brief entitled "Material Facts" is argumentative, 
misleading, full of legal conclusions and distorts the facts. 
The State will treat that section as part of appellant's 
argument. 
ISSUE 
The single issue presented by this appeal is whether 
the grandfathered MBAs and Utah Blue Cross are so similarly 
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situated that the legislative choice to treat the two differ-
ently for tax purposes is so unreasonable as to violate the 
Utah and United States Constitutions as a matter of law. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PROPER STANDARD OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW IN TAX CASES 
IS TO GIVE GREAT DEFERENCE TO LEGISLATIVE CLASSIFICATIONS. 
The State agrees with Utah Blue Cross that no "higher 
standard of constitutional review" than the "rational basis" 
standard is applicable to this case. Appellant's brief at 
16-17. The "rational basis" standard is the standard of the 
greatest deference to legislative choice. The standard has 
recently been stated by this Court as follows: 
When neither a fundamental right nor a suspect class-
ification is involved, equal protection requires that 
statutory classifications bear a reasonable relation 
to the purpose sought to be accomplished and that 
there be a reasonable basis for the distinction 
between the classes. Classifications are not unrea-
sonable or arbitrary as long as similarly situated 
people are dealt with in a similar manner and people 
situated differently are not treated as if their 
circumstances were the same. 
J.J.N.P. Co. v. State, 655 P.2d 1133, 1137 (Utah 1982). There-
fore, if the State can show any rational reason for classifying 
Utah Blue Cross differently from the MBAs and there is a rea-
sonable relationship between the classification and the purpose 
of the classification, the statute must be upheld. 
As Utah Blue Cross noted at pages 28-29 of its brief, 
the standard of review is identical under each of the three 
constitutional provisions argued by Utah Blue Cross. The 
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Federal Constitutional provision is under the equal protection 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The two provisions under 
the Utah Constitution are the requirement of "uniform opera-
tion of the laws," Article I, Section 24, and the prohibition 
against "private or special laws," Article VI, Section 26. If 
the statute is invalid under any one of these constitutional 
provisions, it is invalid under all three. The converse is 
also true. 
While there is no dispute that the standard to be 
applied is the "rational basis" test, the method of applying 
that test differs under some circumstances. For example, in 
tax cases the courts uniformly apply the rule of great defer-
ence to legislative classification. The Supreme Court of 
Wisconsin in Simanco v. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue, 57 Wis.2d 
47, 203 N.W.2d 648 (1973), dealt with an equal protection chal-
lenge to a tax statute. After recognizing that the burden of 
proof on a challenger to the constitutionality of a statute is 
"heavy indeed", the court went on to note that "where a tax 
measure is involved, the presumption of constitutionality is 
strongest." M . at 54, 651. The court discussed a long 
"series of uninterrupted cases" from the Supreme Court of the 
United States holding that "[t]he States have a very wide dis-
cretion in the laying of their taxes" and that "[i]f the selec-
tion or classification is neither capricious nor arbitrary, 
and rests upon some reasonable consideration of difference or 
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policy, there is no denial of the equal protection of the law." 
I_d. at 55-56, 652, quoting Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. 
Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 526-27 (1959). See also, Dandridge v. 
Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); Walters v. City of St. Louis, 
347 U.S. 231 (1954); Green v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 233 (1920). 
In a similar case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated: 
"[A] legislature has much more leeway in granting exemptions in 
taxation statutes than it does in regulatory measures enacted 
under its police power without running athwart of the equal-
protection-of-the-laws clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 
Associated Hospital Service, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 13 
Wis.2d 447, 470, 109 N.W.2d 271, 282 (1961). In Leo Feist, 
Inc. v. Young, 46 F.Supp. 622, 629 (E.D.Wis. 1942), the court 
stated that "[t]he court must presume that legislation [sic] 
distinctions have been made on a rational basis if there is any 
conceivable state of facts which would support it." The burden 
is on the appellant Utah Blue Cross to demonstrate that no 
rational reason can be conceived for treating Utah Blue Cross 
differently from the MBAs. Moritz v. Commissioner, 469 F.2d 
466, 469, (10th Cir. 1972). Because Utah Blue Cross has not 
carried and cannot hope to carry this burden under any version 
of the facts, the court below acted properly in granting sum-
mary judgment to the State. 
POINT II 
THERE IS A RATIONAL BASIS REASONABLY RELATED TO THE 
ACHIEVEMENT OF PERMISSIBLE STATE POLICIES FOR CLASSIFYING 
UTAH BLUE CROSS DIFFERENTLY FROM THE GRANDFATHERED MBAS. 
-7-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Besides the most obvious differences between the MBAs 
and Utah Blue Cross tabulated in Appendix A to this brief and 
those appearing in the Record at pages 108-115, a number of 
significant reasons exist for distinguishing between the two. 
In addition, there is a third group that must be considered, a 
group that is not party to this proceeding. That group con-
sists of the more than twelve hundred insurers in the State of 
Utah subject to taxation. (R. 509-511, 632-634.) The legisla-
ture classified the different types of insurance providers for 
regulatory, administrative and fiscal reasons. Those classifi-
cations were based upon study and deliberation; they were not 
arbitrary or capricious. This Court should be slow to invali-
date the legislative scheme. 
A. The Statutory Distinctions of Title 31 of Utah 
Code Ann, are Eacially Nondiscriminatory? 
On its face, Utah Code Ann. § 31-37-9(2), the chal-
lenged tax statute, is general in application. That section 
provides: 
(2) There shall be paid to the state tax commis-
sion by every corporation subject to the provisions 
of this act a tax of 2 1/4% of the total subscribtion 
income received by it during the next preceding 
calendar year from contracts covering risks in this 
state less the amount of all subscription income 
returned or credited to subscribers on direct busi-
ness in this state. 
1. The tax is imposed on every 
chapter 37 corporation. 
By its express terms, the tax applies to every cor-
poration subject to the provisions of title 31, chapter 37. 
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Chapter 37 applies to certain types of entities that are nei-
ther commercial insurance companies nor traditional corpora-
tions. As such, those entities are allowed benefits not 
available to, and are subjected to burdens not imposed on, 
entities not incorporated under chapter 37- These topics will 
be developed more completely in subsequent portions of the 
brief. At this point it is important to recognize that the 
MBAs cannot incorporate under chapter 37 without significantly 
altering both their methods of operation and the types of 
services offered. Conversely, Utah Blue Cross cannot continue 
to offer the services it presently offers unless it complies 
with the provisions of chapter 37. Utah Blue Cross is, there-
fore, placed in the position of arguing that it may be treated 
differently from the MBAs for all purposes other than tax 
purposes. This argument must fail. 
2. The tax is not a special law directed at 
Utah Blue Cross alone. 
By the use of its own name as a shorthand for corpor-
ations subject to chapter 37, Utah Blue Cross implies, although 
it does not expressly state, that it is alone in being taxed on 
subscription income. The allegation that the tax is a special 
law directed at Utah Blue Cross, however, is express. This is 
not the case. 
The legislative record of the 1969 passage of the 
Nonprofit Hospital, Medical-Surgical, Dental, and Health 
Service Corporation Act, chapter 37 of title 31, contains many 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
references indicating that the aim of the statute was not to 
single out Utah Blue Cross for special treatment. At the time 
the Act was passed, at least four such corporations were in 
existence, and the legislature anticipated the future incorpor-
ation of other health service corporations. (R. 651, 654-655, 
658.) One of those four corporations, the Delta Plan, is still 
in existence but is in receivership. Thus, this case is not 
like Continental Bank & Trust v. Farmington City, 599 P.2d 1242 
(Utah 1979), a case heavily relied on by Utah Blue Cross. In 
Continental Bank a tax statute specifically and expressly 
tailored to one amusement park, Lagoon, was struck down as 
violative of equal protection rights. No such improper classi-
fication of a single entity is involved here. 
3. Utah Code Ann. § 31-37-9(2) is constitutionally 
valid even if Utah Blue Cross is the only 
corporation regulated by it. 
Since the merger of Blue Cross of Utah and Blue 
Shield of Utah into Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Utah on 
January 1, 1982, (R. 439), Utah Blue Cross may be the only 
corporation presently operating under chapter 37 in Utah. 
However, even if Utah Blue Cross is alone in that respect, the 
challenged statute does not deny equal protection of the law. 
In Continental Bank, the Lagoon case, this Court 
invalidated a tax only after finding that it represented such 
an improper classification that its operation became "discrim-
inatory, arbitrary, and an abuse of the taxing power." 599 
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P.2d at 1245. No such finding could be made in the present 
case. Ample evidence shows that no legislative design to tax 
Utah Blue Cross unfairly existed at the time the questioned 
statute was passed. See, subsection II B. below. Subsequent 
changes in the business climate cannot render a legislative act 
that was reasonable when passed an abuse of discretion. Fur-
ther, this Court cautioned in Continental Bank that "[t]here 
are cases where a single, unique business entity has consti-
tuted a proper class for taxation purposes. In fact, this 
Court has specifically sustained the idea that a classification 
which comprises a single business entity does not per se render 
the classification unreasonable." Id. at 1245. 
In so deciding, this Court relied on the cases of 
Salt Lake City Lines v. Salt Lake City, 6 Utah 2d 428, 315 P.2d 
859 (1957), and Salt Lake City v. Utah Light & Railway Co., 45 
Utah 50, 142 P. 1067 (1914). Both cases involved legislative 
classification of single entities. This Court upheld those 
classifications as reasonable because the entities so classi-
fied were unique. 
United States v. Maryland Savings-Share Insurance 
Corp., 400 U.S. 4 (1970), illustrates the great deference to 
legislative enactments that the Supreme Court of the United 
States has mandated under the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. In that case, deposit insurance compa-
nies that were concededly identical in all respects except for 
the dates of their incorporation were classified differently 
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for federal income tax purposes. Four deposit insurance compa-
nies created before the cutoff date of September 1, 1957, were 
tax-exempt under a specific statutory provision. One deposit 
insurance company, the Maryland Savings-Share Insurance Corp., 
was created after the cutoff, and was, thus, subject to taxa-
tion. Maryland Savings attacked the application of the tax to 
it under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The United States Supreme Court found the purpose of the 
-cutoff statute to be to discourage Maryland Savings and others 
from forming deposit insurance companies. This purpose was 
rational in view of the federal policy to eliminate competition 
for the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Therefore, the 
Supreme Court upheld the tax despite the fact that it fell on 
only one of five state deposit insurance companies. 
It is clear that if there is any rational basis for 
classifying health service corporations differently from MBAs., 
the classification is not invalid simply because there is only 
one health service corporation in the state at any given time. 
B. The Legislative History of the Challenged Statute 
Reveals That Utah Blue Cross is Not Unfairly 
Taxed. " ~~~. 
The legislative history of the entire development of 
the insurance code is set forth in detail in the State's "State-
ment of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiff's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment" submitted to the court 
below. (R. 466-476, 589-599.) In addition, the legislative 
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debate concerning the challenged tax statute, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 31-37-9(2), is set out at length in the record beginning at 
pages 514 and 637. This discussion will focus on only those 
parts of the record which illustrate that the legislature had a 
rational basis for taxing health service corporations differ-
ently from the MBAs. 
1. The State legislature recognized that Utah Blue 
Cross is different from the MBAs. 
In 1969 the Utah Insurance Code underwent a major 
revision. As a part of that revision, the old MBA statutes 
were repealed, but MBAs already in existence were specifically 
grandfathered. 1969 Utah Laws, Chapter 74, Section 8. Also as 
a part of that revision, the "Non-Profit Hospital Service Plans 
Act," (chapter 30 of title 31) under which Utah Blue Cross had 
been regulated since 1947, was replaced by the "Nonprofit 
Hospital, Medical-Surgical, Dental, and Health Service Corpora-
tion Act," the present chapter 37 of title 31. Utah Blue Cross 
had a hand in drafting the bill that became the Act. (R. 642.) 
The bill did not contain a taxing provision when it was submit-
ted to the legislature. That provision was added by the legis-
lative committee. (R. 637-640.) Some of the representatives 
voiced the opinion that they had "broken faith" with Utah Blue 
Cross by changing the "agreement" by amendment. (R. 640.) 
The concern was expressed that the tax would have to 
apply to the MBAs as well as to the health service corpora-
tions. The legislature indicated that the law should not be so 
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interpreted. (R. 646-647, 650.) In so doing, the legislature 
recognized the fraternal nature of the MBAs and their specific 
differences from Utah Blue Cross. Just one week later, on 
March 13, 1969, the same legislature voted to repeal the MBA 
statutes and to grandfather existing MBAs. Clearly, the legis-
lature perceived a fundamental difference between Utah Blue 
Cross and the MBAs. 
The legislature expressed the concern that Utah Blue 
Cross and other health service corporations were being given an 
unfair tax advantage over commercial insurance companies sub-
ject to a premium tax. The subscription tax of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 31-37-9(2) was expressly intended to remedy this situation. 
The legislature decided that Utah Blue Cross' business more 
closely resembled the business of the commercial insurance 
companies than it did that of the MBAs. As such, the legisla-
ture decided that it was fair to subject Utah Blue Cross and 
others enjoying the same benefits as Utah Blue Cross to a tax 
identical to the tax levied against the more than twelve hun-
dred other insurers in the state. (R. 643-645, 632-633.) 
In deciding to tax the nonprofit organizations, the 
legislature was following a trend in this country of question-
ing the charitable status of Blue Cross organizations. Repre-
sentative Mecham pointed out that eight states had already 
passed legislation taxing Blue Cross programs. (R. 665.) 
See also, Borland v. Bayonne Hospital, 122 N.J.Super. 387, 300 
A.2d 584 (1973)(holding Blue Cross plans to be non-charitable); 
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Associated Hospital Service, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 13 Wis. 
*d 447, 109 N.W.2d 271 (1961) (holding Blue Cross plans to 
**«» charitable). 
The purpose of the legislature in passing the chal-
lenged t.ci>: Wii: t (J equalize the tax but den. In the words of 
Representative Mecham, the tax was intended to make it so that 
"we all get the even bite of taxes." (R. 666.) Representative 
Mecham concluded his speech supporting the tax as follows: "So 
-going back to this old proposition of equality in taxes, I 
think your vote should rest on that, and let's vote to equalize 
taxes." (R. 666.) Other representatives expressed similar 
views. Surely, a purpose to equalize taxes between similarly 
situated entities is a rational objective, and the m^ in:-, chosen 
to obtain that objective is tailored to that end. The State 
submits that this objective alone is sufficient to defeat Utah 
Blue Cross' claims. 
C. The History of Utah Blue Cross Demonstrates 
the Need to Treat Utah Blue Cross Differently 
From the MBAs. 
At least as early as 1947, the Utah legislature 
recognized a distinction between Utah Blue Cross (then separate 
from Utah Blue Shield) and all other insurance companies includ-
ing fraternal organization esignated as MBAs. (R. 471.) 
Since 1969, the State has taxed nonprofit hospital service 
corporations (which then included Utah Blue Cross and Utah Blue 
Shield as separate entities) and cummer rial insurance compa-
nies. At the same time, MBAs have remained exempt from the 
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tax. (R. 472.) The history and method of operation of Blue 
Cross type organizations illustrate the reasons for the dis-
tinction. 
1. Utah Blue Cross is not an insurance company. 
The following excerpt is taken from Utah Blue Cross' 
brief on appeal at page 7: 
Utah Blue Cross is a nonprofit health 
service corporation operating pursuant to the provi-
sions of the Nonprofit Health Service Corporation 
Act, Utah Code Ann. § 31-37-1 et se_g. (R. 2, 31). As 
such, Utah Blue Cross provides payment for health, 
accident and other medically related expenses in-
curred by its subscribers. Utah Blue Cross provides 
this service to members of the public both individu-
ally and through group plans. In essence then, Utah 
Blue Cross is a nonprofit provider of health and 
disability insurance. (R. 240). 
This statement, strictly speaking, is incorrect. 
Utah Blue Cross bases its entire argument upon the premise that 
it is an insurance provider in the same sense that the MBAs are 
insurance providers. As the following discussion will demon-
strate, the premise is false. 
Health care service plans made their first appearance 
in this country in the late 1920's when it became clear that 
the country was facing a health care crisis. The great depres-
sion increased the problem, and "a vast number of the popula-
tion [had to] go without needed medical attention." See, 
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan v. Demlow, 403 Mich. 399, 
419-420, 270 N.W.2d 845, 850 (1978). Private health care 
service organizations were formed for the purpose of making 
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health care available to a greater number of persons. The 
first such organization was the plan established by the Baylor 
University Hospital in Dallas, Texas, in 1929. Associated Hos-
pital Service, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 13 Wis.2d 447, 454, 
109 N.W.2d 271, 274 (1961). 
These plans provided for prepaid medical services as 
opposed to indemnification for medical expenses incurred. The 
plans did well, but were faced with some judicial obstacles 
early on. They were accused of operating as insurance compa-
nies without complying with insurance laws and of practicing 
medicine without a license. While most courts rejected the 
idea that the plans were insurance companies, some courts did 
not. The confusion lead to the passage of special enabling 
statutes to allow the plans to operate outside of the state 
insurance regulations. Demlow, at 421-422, 851 (see cases 
cited within). Without the enabling statutes, Utah Blue Cross 
would not be allowed to operate in the way it does. This is a 
great benefit to Utah Blue Cross. 
The distinction between indemnity insurance and 
prepaid medical services is real, not illusory. Utah Blue 
Cross operates in a manner quite different from the MBAs. Utah 
Blue Cross' operations involve two types of contractural rela-
tionships. The first, and most significant, is the contract 
between Utah Blue Cross and Utah hospitals and physicians. 
Those hospitals and physicians that contract with Utah Blue 
Cross, called participating providers, agree to provide free 
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medical services to Utah Blue Cross subscribers. In return, 
Utah Blue Cross agrees to pay to the providers a fee set by the 
UCR ("usual, customary and reasonable") method for each speci-
fic service rendered. The participating providers agree to 
accept the set fee as payment in full for the service rendered. 
Nonparticipating providers receive payment from Blue Cross for 
services rendered to subscribers through the subscribers, but 
only to the extent of the fixed fee for each service rendered. 
The other contract is between Utah Blue Cross and the subscrib-
ers. The subscribers pay a fixed fee, usually monthly, as a 
prepayment for medical services. This method of operation is 
set out in detail in the cases of Demlow, Associated Hospital 
Service, and Insurance Commissioner of Maryland v. Blue Shield, 
456 A.2d 914 (Md. 1983). None of the MBAs do business in this 
manner. 
From the above it is clear that Utah Blue Cross is 
not an insurance provider. Although Utah Blue Cross is in the 
same market as the insurance companies, a fact recognized by 
the legislature when it decided to tax health service corpora-
tions, it provides health services, not indemnification. Many 
courts have recognized the "unique" position of Blue Cross 
plans and the fact that Blue Cross is not an insurance company. 
Besides those cases already cited above, the following cases 
have reached a similar conclusion: Karaskiewicz v. Blue Cross 
and Blue Shield, 336 N.W.2d 757 (Mich.App. 1983); Blue Cross 
and Blue Shield v. Insurance Bureau, 104 Mich.App. 113, 304 
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N.W.2d 499 (1981); Blue Cross of Kansas, Inc. v. Bell, 227 Kan. 
426, 607 P.2d 498 (1980). 
Utah Blue Cross counters this argument by asserting 
that the difference is only "administrative" and that the 
contract between the subscribers and Utah Blue Cross looks like 
any other insurance contract if the contracts with the pro-
viders are ignored. See, Appellants Brief at 30-33. This 
argument is without merit. 
The argument that the provider contracts are separate 
and distinct from the subscriber contracts for purposes of this 
action is based on a selective and skewed reading of Group 
Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979). 
The issues of that case are so different from those involved in 
this case that comparison serves no purpose. Even so, the 
dictum of that case that the agreements between the providers 
and Utah Blue Cross are not "the business of insurance" sup-
ports the State's conclusion rather than that of Utah Blue 
Cross. In any case, to ignore half of the operation of Utah 
Blue Cross in order to make the other half look the way Utah 
Blue Cross would like it to be viewed for purposes of this 
litigation is to look so closely at the hole as to miss the 
doughnut. 
In Salt Lake City Lines v. Salt Lake City, 6 Utah 2d 
428, 315 P.2d 859 (1957), this Court rejected an argument 
similar to that now advanced by Utah Blue Cross. Salt Lake 
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City Lines challenged, on equal protection grounds, a statute 
that taxed only Salt Lake Lines. This Court rejected the 
challenge. The classification was found to be reasonable even 
though Salt Lake Lines was the only entity subject to the tax 
because it was the only entity in the State licensed to operate 
electric vehicles for mass transportation purposes. Salt Lake 
Lines argued that because it had ceased to operate any electri-
cal vehicles in 1947, its operation of motor buses was not 
different from other mass transportation companies' operations. 
This argument failed. This Court stated .that "[t]he ordinance 
gives the company a 50-year right to use city streets to oper-
ate electric vehicles of two types, . . . " and that "[njonuse 
of one part of a multiprivileged franchise does not destroy the 
others." Id. at 432, 861-862. Similarly, in determining 
whether there is any rational basis for treating Utah Blue 
Cross differently from the MBAs, all of Utah Blue Cross' opera-
tions must be considered. 
A survey of the Articles of Incorporation of Utah 
Blue Cross sheds some added light. The purposes of Utah Blue 
Cross are set forth in Article IX of the plan of consolidation 
of Blue Cross of Utah and Blue Shield of Utah. (R. 440-442.) 
Conspicuous in this statement of the purposes of Utah Blue 
Cross is the absence of the word "insurance" in any of its 
forms. Instead, the purposes are stated to be "[t]o secure the 
general, economic, and timely availability of hospital, medical-
surgical, dental, and other health services. . . ," and "to 
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make available to such subscribers and others hospital care, 
medical-surgical care, dental care, and other health service 
care . . . ," and "[t]o enter into contracts for the rendering 
of hospital services, medical-surgical services, dental ser-
vices or other health services . . . ." .Id. (emphasis added). 
This language was not chosen inadvisedly by Utah Blue Cross. 
It was chosen carefully in order to comply with and gain the 
benefits of the Nonprofit Hospital, Medical-Surgical, Dental, 
and Health Service Corporation Act, Chapter 37 of Title 31 of 
Utah Code Ann. As may be seen, Utah Blue Cross wishes to be 
considered the equivalent of an insurance company only for the 
purposes of this tax litigation. 
The argument that the difference is only "an internal 
administrative difference" and that Utah Blue Cross could 
choose to operate like the MBAs, or, conversely, that the MBAs 
could choose to operate like Utah Blue Cross, is without merit. 
The MBAs simply could not choose to operate through contractual 
arrangements with providers to provide health services without 
complying with the provisions of chapter 37, title 31 of Utah 
Code Ann., including the tax provision of that chapter. Simi-
larly, Utah Blue Cross could not operate as an insurance com-
pany without complying with the general provisions of the 
insurance code. The MBAs and Utah Blue Cross do operate dif-
ferently and the fact that either could choose to incorporate 
under a different statute in order to be like the other does 
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not change the present fact that they are different. Facially 
neutral legislation can treat differently situated entities 
differently without offending equal protection policies. 
Utah Blue Cross makes a similar argument in answer to 
the State's assertion that one of the differences between the 
MBAs and Utah Blue Cross is that Utah Blue Cross cannot provide 
life insurance or annuity type contracts. Utah Code Ann. § 31-
37-15. Utah Blue Cross states at pages 35-36 of their brief: 
'"Utah Blue Cross, if it chose to, could provide life insurance 
and annuities upon complying with these [meaning chapter 22 of 
title 31] and any other applicable statutory provisions." This 
statement, itself, defeats Utah Blue Cross' argument. If Utah 
Blue Cross complied with the provisions of chapter 22, it would 
be subject to the insurance tax imposed by chapter 14 of title 
31. On the other hand, the MBAs are already subject to chapter 
22 ( See, Utah Code Ann. § 31-22-1.4), but are exempted from 
the insurance tax by the operation of Utah Code Ann. § 31-14-
4(1). Again, the legislative distinctions are based on the 
differences between entities operating under and receiving the 
benefits of different chapters of the insurance code. They are 
not based on whether Utah Blue Cross or the MBAs have the power 
to operate differently than they presently do. 
Operating under chapter 37, Utah Blue Cross enjoys 
benefits not available to the MBAs or to commercial insurance 
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companies. There are ample reasons for treating Utah Blue 
Cross like the "unique" entity it is. 
2. Utah Blue Cross enjoys the benefits of being 
a chapter 37 corporation. 
Because of Utah Blue Cross' unique position in the 
health field, Utah Blue Cross enjoys a number of benefits not 
shared by commercial insurance companies or by the MBAs. See, 
Insurance Commissioner of Maryland v. Blue Shield, 456 A.2d 
914, 919 (Md. 1983). Besides being subject to different fee 
schedules, procedural requirements and regulatory controls, the 
most significant benefit enjoyed by Utah Blue Cross stems from 
the statutory mandate allowing Utah Blue Cross to contract 
directly with the hospitals and doctors of the State to provide 
health services. Utah Code Ann. § 31-37-8. The MBAs and other 
commercial insurance companies do not enjoy this benefit. As 
was already noted above, health service plans were not able to 
operate without specific enabling statutes in some states 
because of their noncompliance with the insurance codes and 
because they were held to be practicing medicine without a 
license. Insurance Commissioner of Maryland at 919-920; Asso-
ciated Hospital Service, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 13 Wis.2d 
447, 472, 109 N.W.2d 271, 283 (1961). 
In Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan v. Demlow, 403 
Mich. 399, 270 N.W.2d 845 (1978), the Supreme Court of Michigan 
recognized that Blue Cross "is not an insurance company in the 
-23-
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I 
usual sense of the term." That court's finding was as follows: 
BCBSM [Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan] has a 
direct and distinct contractual relationship both 
with its subscribers and with the participating 
providers. Other entities in the health care pro-
tection field, most notably health insurance compa-
nies, do not enjoy such a position. They have a 
contractual relationship only with their policyhold-
ers. Unlike BCBSM, they do not have direct access to 
both sides of the health care equation. 
Id. at 417, 849. Having access to both sides of the health 
care equation is an advantage of such worth that its impor-
tance cannot be overstated. 
The advantage that Utah Blue Cross enjoys stems from 
the direct contractual relationship between the providers and 
Utah Blue Cross. A simple example will illustrate the point. 
When a Utah Blue Cross subscriber receives services from a 
provider, the provider has no claim for payment against the 
subscriber. Instead, the provider has a direct claim against 
Utah Blue Cross. Contrasted with this is the position of the 
provider in a case where the provider renders the same services 
to a patient insured by an MBA or by a commercial insurance 
company. In such a case, the provider has a direct claim 
against the insured, and only a derivative claim against the 
insurance company. It is not difficult to recognize the advan-
tage enjoyed by Utah Blue Cross as a result of this arrange-
ment. 
There is a strong incentive for hospitals and doctors 
to participate in the Blue Cross plans. The claim against the 
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deeper pocket and the assurance that such a claim provides are 
obvious advantages over the alternative- Further, there is an 
incentive for individuals to subscribe to a Blue Cross plan and 
to select a doctor or a hospital that is a participating pro-
vider. When a subscriber selects a participating provider, the 
subscriber can rest assured that Utah Blue Cross will be liable 
for the entire cost of any services rendered. On the other 
hand, if a subscriber selects a nonparticipating provider, the 
subscriber will be liable for amounts charged by that provider 
in excess of the UCR amount prescribed by Utah Blue Cross. 
This is also an added incentive for providers to participate in 
the plan. 
The Utah legislature recognized this advantage when 
deciding to tax Utah Blue Cross equally with other insurance 
companies. For example, Representative Gunnell pointed out 
that "a lot of testimony" was presented to the legislative 
council "as to the price of premiums [,] as to the degree of 
coverage, as to the competitive benefits that were enjoyed by 
this organization [Utah Blue Cross] that were not enjoyed by 
others." Representative Gunnell concluded that "it would be 
absolutely fair in light of the competitive situation that 
exists in the insurance industry" to tax Utah Blue Cross equal-
ly with insurance companies. (R. 644-645.) In addition, 
Representative Workman stated that the Blue Cross movement is 
"a movement that none of the rest of the businessmen that I 
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know of have the benefit of, and that's more or less a guaran-
tee of your accounts receivable." (R. 666-667.) Therefore, 
the legislature, in order to reduce the competitive advantage 
Utah Blue Cross and similar health service corporations enjoyed 
over other insurance providers, voted to eliminate the unfair 
tax-exempt status of health service corporations. Such a 
purpose is not only rational, it is laudable. 
To illustrate the reality of the business advantage 
enjoyed by Utah Blue Cross, it is interesting to note that Utah 
Blue Cross presently has contracted with approximately 80% of 
the physicians and 100% of the licensed hospitals in the State 
of Utah. In Kansas, Blue Cross has contracts with 94% of the 
physicians and 100% of the hospitals, and serves approximately 
51% of the Kansas population. Blue Cross of Kansas v. Bell, 
227 Kan. 426, 428-429, 607 P.2d 498, 501-502 (1980). In Michi-
gan, Blue Cross has contracts with approximately 95% of the 
hospitals and 65% of the physicians, and serves roughly 60% of 
the Michigan population. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan 
v. Demlow, 403 Mich. 399, 419, 270 N.W.2d 845, 850 (1978). 
Similar figures could probably be obtained in most, if not all, 
of the states in the union. Such information persuaded the 
Court of Appeals of Michigan to conclude that "Blue Cross 
enjoys substantial government benefit." Blue Cross and Blue 
Shield v. Insurance Bureau, 104 Mich.App. 113, 132, 304 N.W.2d 
499, 507 (1981). 
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Another benefit enjoyed by Utah Blue Cross that is 
not enjoyed by the MBAs is Utah Blue Cross1 intimate connection 
with federal Medicare and Medicaid. In Salt Lake City, Medicare 
is administered by Utah Blue Cross, and the two are housed in 
the same building. Medicare uses a method of payment similar 
to that used by Utah Blue Cross. A set fee for any given 
service is paid by Medicare to eligible recipients. If this 
fee is below the amount that Utah Blue Cross is obligated to 
.pay for the same service, Utah Blue Cross pays only the differ-
ence (between Medicare's set fee and its set fee) to the pro-
vider of the service on behalf of its subscribers. This rela-
tionship makes Utah Blue Cross type plans advantageous for the 
elderly. 
Utah Blue Cross has accepted the benefits of special 
enabling statutes in Utah since 1947 and has paid the tax 
imposed by section 9(2) of chapter 37 of title 31 without 
protest since 1969. Utah Blue Cross should not now be allowed 
to question the validity of statutes under which it has re-
ceived substantial benefits. A similar situation was pre-
sented to this Court in Salt Lake City Lines v. Salt Lake City, 
6 Utah 2d 428, 315 P.2d 859 (1957). Salt Lake City Lines 
operated under a franchise and paid a license tax for approxi-
mately ten (10) years before questioning the constitutional 
validity of the tax. This Court stated: "All of the conten-
tions mentioned seem to be vulnerable to the general proposi-
-97-
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tion that one accepting the benefits of legislation, ordinarily 
is speechless in denouncing its validity, even on constitution-
al grounds." ^d. at 431, 860-861; see, Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 
U.S. 245, 255 (1947); Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 
297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (Justice Brandeis, concurring). This 
Court stated that Salt Lake City Lines could not be allowed to 
"[live] within the legislation's mansion" and yet claim that it 
"need pay no board simply because [it had] not signed a meal 
ticket." Such a holding would "flout reason and strap the law 
in a straightjacket laced with unreasonable technicality." 
Salt Lake City Lines at 861. Similarly, Utah Blue Cross should 
not be allowed to accept the benefits, but escape the burdens, 
of chapter 37. 
D. The Utah Legislature Acted Rationally in 
Grandfathering the MBAsT 
Utah Blue Cross chooses to ignore the fact that there 
are more than twelve hundred insurers in the State that are 
taxed the same as Utah Blue Cross and focuses on the six remain-
ing MBAs that are not taxed. Utah Blue Cross argues that it is 
so similarly situated to the MBAs that it is denied equal 
protection if it is taxed and the MBAs are not. However, Utah 
Blue Cross admits that if there is any rational reason for 
treating the MBAs differently than Utah Blue Cross, its appeal 
must fail. Appellant's brief at 16-17. The State submits that 
grandfathering the fraternal organizations known as MBAs was a 
rational act. 
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When the legislature perceived that the need for MBAs 
had passed, it was faced with the problem of what to do with 
existing MBAs. In eliminating MBAs, the legislature probably 
recognized the hardship that would have been visited upon 
members of existing MBAs if those organizations were disbanded. 
Not the least of the legislature's worries may have been the 
possible violation of the due process of law clause of the 
United States Constitution if the legislature acted to elimin-
ate property benefits which the MBA members had purchased and 
on which they had a right to rely. Other valid and reasonable 
considerations likely also entered into the decision to grand-
father the MBAs. Utah Blue Cross does not argue that there was 
no valid reason for grandfathering MBAs, nor could they. In-
stead, Utah Blue Cross asserts that it is so similarly situ-
ated to the MBAs for tax purposes, that a tax on Utah Blue 
Cross that is not also levied against the MBAs is an abuse of 
the taxing power. Even if the position of Utah Blue Cross for 
tax purposes were identical to that of the MBAs, which it 
clearly is not, this argument would fail on the authority of 
United States v. Maryland Savings-Share Insurance Corp., 400 U.S. 
4 (1970). 
In Maryland Savings, a tax that grandfathered certain 
insurance companies was challenged on constitutional grounds. 
Maryland Savings, which was concededly identical to the four 
grandfathered deposit insurance companies in every respect 
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except for the date of incorporation, argued that the cutoff 
date was arbitrary and an abuse of the taxing power. The United 
States Supreme Court recognized that the purpose of the tax was 
expressly to discourage Maryland Savings and others from incor-
porating after the cutoff date, in order to eliminate competi-
tion to the federal deposit insurance corporation. The Court 
found the purpose reasonable and the method of achieving the 
purpose rationally related to the end sought. In upholding the 
tax, the Court said that "a legislative classification will not 
be set aside if any state of facts rationally justifying it is 
demonstrated to or perceived by the courts." Id. at 6 (emphasis 
added). Therefore, even if Utah Blue Cross were identically 
situated with respect to the MBAs, the classification scheme 
would be valid if there were any rational reason to grandfather 
the MBAs. The State submits that there were ample justifica-
< 
tions for grandfathering MBAs. 
Utah Blue Cross argues that it must compete with the 
MBAs for business and that the tax is an unfair disadvantage. 
< 
That the tax is a disadvantage is clear. Whether it is unfair 
is another issue. 
A primary purpose of the taxes imposed by both Utah 
i 
Code Ann. §§ 31-14-4(1) and 31-37-9(2) is the raising and 
producing of revenue for the State of Utah. While there may be 
some incidental regulatory purposes in the imposition of the 
insurance taxing system, the overriding purpose appears to be 
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the production of income. While the subscription based income 
tax assessed against Blue Cross is doubtless a cost of that 
corporation's doing business in Utah which must be included in 
setting rates for subscribers, the premium tax imposed upon 
other insurance companies by section 31-14-4(1) is similarly a 
cost of doing business for those organizations and will be 
reflected in their rates as offered to policy holders. 
MBAs are not taxed in the same manner as insurance 
companies and nonprofit health care providers. Therefore, they 
do not have to increase their premium rates to recoup their tax 
payments. However, Utah Blue Cross has not provided any evi-
dence of any incremental increases in its subscription rate 
structure directly attributable to the imposition of the sec-
tion 31-37-9(2) tax or that demonstrates that any alleged rate 
increase would be sufficient to put Utah Blue Cross at a compet-
itive disadvantage as against MBAs in luring customers to 
purchase its policies. While Utah Blue Cross may have lost 
some potential contracts to MBAs, there is nothing in the 
record to indicate that those losses were a direct or even 
indirect result of the subscription tax imposed upon Utah Blue 
Cross. On the contrary, evidence submitted by the State indi-
cates that Utah Blue Cross may have lost those contracts for 
any number of reasons, among them being a preference for one 
insurance agent or another, or the fact that the business never 
has openly accepted bids in its insurance contracts. (E. 628-
631.) 
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Even if Utah Blue Cross did lose some business because 
of the tax, that fact alone is insufficient to indicate that 
the tax is unfair. As has been noted, Utah Blue Cross enjoys a 
tremendous business advantage over the MBAs because of its 
ability to contract with providers and because of its relative-
ly large size when compared to the MBAs. The MBAs are rela-
tively small organizations. Most of them have a limited 
clientele and do not compete for other clients or members. The 
legislature acted well within its power when it decided that 
the MBAs needed a tax break in order to insure their continued 
vitality. Utah Blue Cross does not need a similar tax break. 
Surely, a rational reason for grandfathering the MBAs and 
continuing their tax-exempt status can be perceived by this 
Court. The constitutions require no more. 
E. Utah's Sister States Treat Blue Cross Plans 
Differently From MBAs or Insurance Companies 
for Legislative Purposes. 
The purpose of this subsection is to illustrate that 
not only Utah but the other 49 states routinely treat the 
various insurance and health care service organizations differ-
ently for tax or other purposes. The following examples cannot 
provide exact parallels to the Utah laws because the definition 
of MBA, health service corporation, fraternal benefit associa-
tion and other terms relating to types of insurance companies 
varies from state to state, as does the treatment of these 
different statutory entities. These differences in definition 
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and treatment make it difficult to determine from the statute 
books alone just exactly how Blue Cross is treated in some 
states. These examples from other states will serve to illus-
trate that separate classification of these differing entities 
is not irrational. This section is by no means complete. 
1. Idaho. 
The situation in Idaho is very similar to the situ-
ation in Utah. MBAs are treated under one separate chapter of 
the insurance code, and Blue Cross is regulated under another 
separate chapter of the code. 
Chapter 30 of title 41 of the Idaho Code governs 
MBAs, and section 3001 provides that "no other provision of 
this code shall apply to any such association. . .," with some 
stated exceptions. MBAs may still be formed in Idaho under 
this chapter. Section 3028 levies a 3% tax on the "gross 
premiums, dues and other payments received. . . ."by the MBAs 
operating in Idaho. 
Chapter 34 of title 41 of the Idaho Code governs 
"Hospital and Professional Service Corporations." The scope of 
the chapter contained in section 3401 and the definitions 
contained in section 3403 make it clear that this chapter 
applies to Blue Cross type plans. Besides other regulatory 
differences, this chapter imposes a different tax on Blue Cross 
than the tax imposed on MBAs by chapter 30. Section 3427 of 
title 41 was recently amended to raise the tax from one cent 
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($.01) per subscribers' contract, per month, to four cents 
($.04) per subscribers' contract, per month. Not knowing the 
number of Blue Cross subscribers in Idaho it is impossible to 
calculate the amount of the burden imposed by this tax. How-
ever, it is safe to assume that it is well below the 3% tax 
burden imposed on the MBAs. For our purposes, it is enough to 
point out that Idaho treats MBAs and Blue Cross differently for 
tax purposes. 
2. Illinois. 
The situation in Illinois is even more analogous to 
the instant controversy. There, MBAs are taxed, while Blue 
Cross is exempt from tax. 
MBAs are governed by 111. Ann. Stat. Ch. 73 §§ 928 to 
949, a part of the Illinois Insurance Code. Only MBAs organ-
ized prior to June 29, 1937, may operate under this chapter. 
Section 929 grandfathers MBAs organized prior to June 29, 1937. 
Section 930 provides that no new MBAs may be organized after 
that cutoff date. MBAs still operating in Illinois are subject 
to tax under the insurance code. 111. Ann. Stat. Ch. 73 § 949. 
Blue Cross plans are not governed by the Insurance 
Code in Illinois. Instead, Blue Cross plans are governed by 
corporation laws under the Non-Profit Hospital Service Plan 
Act, 111. Ann. Stat. Ch. 32 §§ 551 to 562; the Medical Service 
Plan Act, 111. Ann. Stat. Ch. 32 §§ 563 to 594.2; the Voluntary 
Health Services Plan Act, 111. Ann. Stat. Ch. 32 §§ 595 to 624; 
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the Medical Corporation Act, 111. Ann. Stat. Ch. 32 §§ 631 to 
648; the Vision Service Plan Act, 111. Ann. Stat. Ch. 32 §§ 651 
to 681; the Dental Service Plan Act, 111. Annot. Stat. Ch. 32 
§§ 690.1 to 690.46; and the Pharmaceutical Service Plan Act, 
111. Ann. Stat. Ch. 32 §§ 691.1 to 691.45. This long list 
illustrates the variety of rational means available to a legis-
lature to deal with a creature as unique as Blue Cross. 
Blue Cross type plans are specifically exempted from 
taxation by 111. Ann. Stat. Ch. 32 §§ 562, 590, 621, 678, 
690.43 and 691.42. Blue Cross does not argue in Illinois that 
it is so similar to the MBAs that different tax treatment is 
constitutionally prohibited. 
3. Michigan. 
Blue Cross of Michigan is governed by the Nonprofit 
Health Care Corporation Reform Act of 1981, Mich. Comp. Laws 
Ann. §§ 550.1101 to 550.1704 (West 1983). Section 550.1201(5) 
makes Blue Cross tax-exempt, although this was not always the 
case. See, Op.Atty.Gen. (of Michigan) 1949-50, No. 1036, p. 
344. MBAs are governed by the Fraternal Benefit Societies 
Chapter of Michigan Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 500.8000 to 500.8254, 
and are tax-exempt under section 500.8030. 
4. Arkansas. 
In Arkansas, Blue Cross is governed by chapter 49 of 
the Insurance Code, the Hospital and Medical Service Corpora-
tions Act. Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 66-4901 to -4921 (1947). Blue 
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Cross must pay privilege and property taxes, but is exempt from 
all other taxes. Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 66-4917, 66-4918 (1947). 
MBAs were governed in Arkansas under corporation laws 
separate from the Insurance Code until 1963. Ark. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 64-1301 to -1308 (1947) (repealed in 1963). Those sections 
were replaced by the Nonprofit Corporations Act, chapter 19 of 
title 64 of Ark. Stat. Ann. (1947). However, existing MBAs 
were specifically grandfathered by section 64-1921. It is not 
clear whether existing grandfathered MBAs are subject to tax, 
but corporations operating under the Nonprofit Corporations Act 
are subject to tax. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 64-1916 (1947). 
5. Colorado. 
MBAs in Colorado operated under the Mutual Benefit 
Associations part of the Colorado Insurance Code prior to 1981. 
Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 10-12-301 to -333 (1973). There was no 
specific tax provision in that part. Those sections were 
repealed in 1981, and it is not clear what happened to the 
MBAs. There seems to be no specific grandfather clause. 
Blue Cross is governed by the Nonprofit Hospital, 
Medical-Surgical, and Health Service Corporation Act. Colo. 
Rev. Stat. §§ 10-16-101 to -140. Colorado also has a Prepaid 
Dental Care Plan Law. Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 10-16.5-101 to -116. 
These Acts do not contain any specific tax provisions. 
6. Other states. 
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Other states with specific provisions relating to the 
treatment of Blue Cross type plans are Washington, West Virginia, 
California, Delaware, Hawaii, Kansas and Oklahoma. This list is 
illustrative, and not exhaustive. Separate treatment of Blue 
Cross type plans could probably be found in the other states as 
well. Such an analysis is not necessary, however, because the 
point is adequately made that Blue Cross is considered differ-
ently from MBAs or commercial insurance companies in at least a 
number of states, if not all states Surely, if so many state 
legislatures have classified Blue Cross plans differently from 
other insurance type entities, there must be some rational basis 
for the distinction. Having so showi i, tl le Sta te has carried its 
burden in this proceeding. 
F. There Have Been No Admissions By the State. 
The following statement appears in Utah Blue Cross1 
brief on appeal at page 10: "This case is unusual in that 
there are specific admissions by the State that the subject 
taxing differences under the Insurance Code are inequitable and 
that such inequities translate into competitive advantage for 
those not paying the tax." (Emphasis added .~ue- specific 
admissions by the State would be unusad I T:jee.:. However, 
there have been no such admissions-
This statement, which appears as a part of Utah Blue 
Cross' statement c: f material facts, refers to two separate 
documents. The first is a memorandum to then State Representa-
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tive Gary Brockbank from Roger C. Day, the Commissioner of the 
Insurance Department. The second is a newspaper article from 
the February 2, 1983, edition of The Salt Lake Tribune purport-
edly quoting Governor Scott M. Matheson. The statements excised 
from these documents and characterized by Utah Blue Cross as 
specific admissions by the State are examples of the misleading 
nature of Utah Blue Cross' statement of material facts. 
Even assuming that the documents concerned referred 
to the subject matter of this litigation, which they do not, 
the fact that the Governor or Commissioner Day made the state-
ments quoted about the insurance system would not be the equiv-
alent of "specific admissions by the State." Neither the 
Governor nor Commissioner Day is the State of Utah. Both are 
entitled to express their political opinions, but neither's 
word is the law of this State. The fact that there have been 
no admissions by the State was brought to the attention of coun-
sel for Utah Blue Cross by Linda Luinstra, Assistant Attorney 
General, in a letter dated January 13, 1983. See, Appendix A. 
More importantly, neither document refers to the 
subject matter of this litigation. The memorandum of Commis-
sioner Day appears in the Record at pages 409-410. The basic 
tax inequity recognized and discussed by Commissioner Day in 
that memorandum does not concern Utah Blue Cross at all. 
Commissioner Day states that there is a tax inequity between 
the group of self insurers, MBAs, and Health Maintenance Organ-
izations and all of the other more than twelve hundred insurers 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
in the State subject to tax. While Utah Blue Cross is a part 
of the group of twelve hundred, it is clear that Commissioner 
Day did not have the subject of the similarity or difference of 
Utah Blue Cross and the MBAs in mind when these statements were 
made. Utah Blue Cross' statement that this memorandum is an 
admission by the State that the business of the MBAs and Utah 
Blue Cross "is essentially the same business" is not only 
misleading, it is untrue. A cursory reading of this memorandum 
will reveal that no such admission was made by Commissioner 
Day, much less by the State. 
The statements of Governor Matheson have been more 
misrepresented than those of Commissioner Day. They appear in 
the Record at page 414. The article cited refers to rising 
health care costs, and the Governor expressed his concerns over 
this trend. As a part of his proposal to deal with the prob-
lem, the Governor proposed an equalization of the tax burden 
between self insurers and regulated insurance companies. Utah 
Blue Cross was named in the article as one of the regulated 
insurance companies. No mention at all is made of the MBAs or 
the fact that they are not taxed. This article simply deals 
with a different problem and is inapplicable to this case. The 
Governor might very well express a different opinion as to 
whether MBAs and health service corporations should be treated 
the same for tax purposes. 
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POINT III 
IF UTAH BLUE CROSS MUST BE TREATED THE SAME AS THE MBAS 
FOR TAX PURPOSES, THE PROPER REMEDY IS TO INVALIDATE THE TAX 
EXEMPTION OF THE MBAS, NOT TO INVALIDATE THE ENTIRE 
TAXING SCHEME OF THE INSURANCE CODE. 
Utah Blue Cross is treated differently from the MBAs 
because it is taxed under Utah Code Ann. § 31-37-9(2), while 
the MBAs are exempted from tax by Utah Code Ann. § 31-14-4(1). 
Utah Blue Cross asks this Court to invalidate the tax on it on 
constitutional grounds. The State maintains that both the tax 
and the exemption are valid. In the alternative, the State 
argues that if the two entities are so similarly situated that 
this Court believes they must be treated the same for tax 
purposes, the proper remedy would be to invalidate the exemp-
tion, not the tax. Invalidation of the exemption would impose 
a minor burden on the legislative scheme. On the other hand, 
invalidation of the tax would potentially disrupt the entire 
insurance tax scheme of title 31. Either action would achieve 
the result which this Court may determine is required. The 
State submits that the former (invalidation of the exemption) 
is more rational and involves less judicial legislation than 
the latter (invalidation of the tax). 
If this Court does find the exemption language of 
section 31-14-4(1) to be invalid, it would be proper for the 
Court to widen the scope of the insurance tax found in that 
section such that all insurance companies transacting business 
in the State, including all domestic benefit and cooperative 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
benefit associations, would be required to pay the tax. The 
extension of the act's operation through invalidation of the 
limiting provision while allowing the remainder of the taxing 
scheme to continue in effect would not result in any improper 
judicial legislation. The primary purpose of the statute was 
to raise state revenues and the exemption was a secondary 
objective. If the exemption is invalid, the legislature would 
surely intend that the tax be extended rather than held invalid 
in its entirety. See, Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 
U.S. 165, 185 (1932). 
The threat to the entire legislative insurance tax 
scheme that would be posed by a judicial invalidation of the 
tax on Utah Blue Cross lies in the fact that, by the same 
reasoning, the commercial insurance companies could not be 
required to pay a tax not also levied on the MBAs and Utah Blue 
Cross. The legislature has already decided that Utah Blue 
Cross and the other commercial insurance companies are similarly 
situated for tax purposes. Similarly, the commercial insurers 
are in some ways more closely related to the MBAs than is Utah 
Blue Cross. An invalidation of the tax on Utah Blue Cross 
would most certainly lead to a proliferation of lawsuits by 
other insurance companies subject to the tax. The tax inequity 
complained of by Utah Blue Cross would only be exacerbated by 
such an action. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons the Defendants, the State 
of Utah, the Utah State Tax Commission, and the Utah State 
Insurance Department, respectfully request that this Court 
affirm the decision and judgment of the Third Judicial District 
Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, granting Defendants' 
motion for summary judgment. 
SUBMITTED this ^^day of July, 1984. 
Assistant Attorney 
MAR? BETH W£L2 
Assistant Attorney General 
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APPENDIX A 
I. The following list indicates the most obvious differences 
between Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Utah and the Mutual 
Benefit Associations: 
Blue Cross/Blue Shield MBAs 
§ 31-37-10 § 31-14-1 
Filing Annual Statement 
Certificate ot Authority 
Renewal 
Filing Certified Copy of 
Art. of Incorporation 
Amending Art. of Incorporation 
Each Agent's Examination 
Agent's Qualification License 
or Renewal 
Agent's Appointment Cert. 
or Renewal 
Affixing Seal or Commissioner 
Filing Policy Forms 
Filing Rates 
Disability Benefits Provided 
Ownership and Control 
Ability to Seil Life 
Insurance and Annuities 
Premium Taxes 
Deposit Requirements 
§50 
25 
50 
10 
5 
5 
2 
1 
0 
Required 
Reimbursements 
31-37-15 
Apparently 
Anyone 31-37-7 
Subscribers 
do not vote 
No 
2 1/4%, 31-37-9 
Up to $1,000,000 
31-37-14 
$100 
50 
25 
10 
25 (2 yrs.) 
12 (2 yrs.) 
3 
10 
Not Required 
Yes 
Policyholders 
31-9-11 and 12 
Yes 
-0-, 31-14-4(1) 
$5,000 
31-31-13 
Guaranty Association 
Membership 
Issue Assessable Contracts 
No 31-37-14(7) 
No 
Yes 31-43-1 to -20 
Yes - Contingent 
on surplus 31-31-4 
and 31-9-2 
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Applicability of Other Partially Yes 
Sections ot Utah Code 31-37-3(1) 31-31-15 
Federal Income Tax 
Exemption Yes Yes 
As or 1969f Mutual Benefit Associations can no longer be formed in 
the State of Utah. 
II. Other comments on the differences between Blue Cross and Blue 
Shield ot Utah and the Mutual Benefit Associations: 
The,following is a list of the Mutual Benefit Associations 
licensed in Utah that have the premium tax exemption and the 
accident and health insurance business they produced during 
1981: 
Premiums 
A l l i e d Mutual Assurance A s s o c i a t i o n No A&H Business 
Assoc ia t ed American Mutual Li fe I n s . Co. § 10,828,289 
Desere t Mutual Benef i t A s s o c i a t i o n 30,854,372 
Educators Mutual I n s . Assoc i a t i on 26,516,438 
E l e c t r i c Mutual Benef i t A s s o c i a t i o n 5,845,150 
Gem S t a t e Mutual of Utah 8,924,598 
Tota l S 82,968,847* 
* Total included income for contracts that provided for adminis-
trative servicing only. 
For the year 1981, the combined total business of Blue Cross and 
Blue Shield was as follows: 
Risk Business - $51,624,315 and Administrative Services Only -
$60,060,284** 
Total $111,685,599* 
* Does not include the administration of the Medicare program, 
which exceeded the total. 
** No premium tax on administrative contracts only. 
The total income for health programs that are written or processed 
through insurance type entities for Utah people was approximately 
$370,000,000 (Did not include Medicare). 
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In the above list of Mutual Benefit Associations, the following 
should be noted: 
Allied Mutual 
Associated American 
Deseret Mutual 
Educators Mutual 
Electric Mutual Benefit 
Gem State Mutual 
Does not write accident and health 
insurance 
Writes the general public 
Writes only the LDS church programs 
Writes only business associated 
with the various educational 
systems within the State 
Writes only business associated 
with Utah Power & Light Co. 
Writes the general public 
In the State of Utah the normal premium tax is 2 1/4%,of the 
net premium collected. However, there is no premium tax on 
annuity considerations except on a retaliatory basis. Premium tax 
on a "County Mutual" (Bear River) is only one/half of one percent. 
Premium taxes on workmen's compensation business is 3 1/4%. There 
is no premium tax for health maintenance organizations. There is 
a premium tax ot 3% on surplus lines business. 
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EXPLANATORY NOTES AND INSURANCE DEPARTMENT COMMENTS 
II citations are to the Initial section of the Insurance Code unless otherwise designated es a title or chapter. 
O * NO examination required of Blue Cross/Blue Shield solicitors. 
AME -Same examination as is required for a regular health insurance agent's license. 
.D.-Less detailed examination than is required for a regular health insurance agent's license. 
% on Fire and Casualty. 
isurance Department Comment - "Filing and approval of contracts is not statutory, however, contracts are approved by department 
s a matter ot fact* ' 
domestic companies are exempt from premium tax for a period of five years from the date of oiganization and thereafter subject to 
tax equal to one-half the existing premium tax. 
)nly on foreign corporation authorized to transact business In Arkansas. * 
Jo netti for prior approval of group rates. 
Answer applies to Blue Cross only. Blue Shield regulated by Attorney General under the non-profit Service Corporation Statute (Sec 
1200 ot California Corporate Code). 
Contracts between Blue Cress and the hospital are not filed. 
riled for information purposes only. 
}n Blue Cress only. 
Subject to leduction according to percentage of investment of assets In specified Idaho securities. 
Domestic insurers must pay a grcss income tax (Title BAt Sec. 2601 ot Indiana Statutes) or may elect to pay a 2% premium tax. 
Indiana has a •Tile and Use*' law. 
Insurance Department Comment-"By administrative ruling Hospital Service Corporations are subject to the same regulations as Acci-
dent & Health Insurers." 
$140 on first $7,000 of premiums collected and $170 on each additional $10,000 or fraction thereof, plus $250 annual fee. 
Effective 1/1/77 premium tax on domestic companies from 3.2 to 2.4 for 1977 and 1S76 and 2% for subsequent years. 
Prior approval of individual rates and certificates. Group rates and contracts subject to subsequent disapproval. 
Domestic companies are taxed at the rate of .005 of capital and surplus up to a maximum of $50,000. 
Subject to certain conditions under 62C.15. 
1975 Montana legislature place the supervision of Blue Cross-Blue Shield under Insurance Department jurisdiction effective July 1, 1975. 
Plans are subject to an essessment to defray the cost of the Insurance Department. 
Tax is 1.6% of premium income plus 4.5% ot allocated net income. 
Statute {Sec. 17?9.0S) piovides for a fee of one cent for each contract issued by every hospital service association to its subscribers. 
Domiciled companies pey .3 of 1% of adjusted capital and suiplus. 
Foreign companies tax rate subject to reduction according to percentage of assets invested in specified Oklahoma securities. 
Individual only. 
Subject to reduction for Investment in specified Texas securities. 
Subject to up to 1% reduction tor investment in specified West Virginia securities. 
Subject to up to 1% reduction tor investment in specified Wyoming securities. 
Additional copies of this survey may be obtained by wilting to: 
THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF LIFE UNDERWRITERS 
1S22F. Street. N.W. 
WasVir.gtcn. DC. 20;'06 
A1TN: Lev/Department 
July 1. 1S7B 
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THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF UTAH 
January 13, 1983 
Michael R. Murphy 
David R. Money 
JONES, WALDO, KOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
800 Walker Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
DAVID L WILKINSON 
iTTO*N£Y GENERA 
n**,£AULM-TiNm 
OEFVTr ATTORNEY GENERA 
JUOUKD L DEWSKU! 
Soucnor b*r*n 
nUNKLYK B. M A T K E S O N , QUI 
GOvtmnitf.itt Altatrs Dntftio 
ItOBERT JL WALLACE. Chk 
Uttoaiton Dmio 
WILUA.MT.EVA.VS.Q* 
H%rrar> Resources D"is*o< 
DONALD S^COLIMAN.Cn-
™YVCA Resources Dtvisioi 
MARX X.BUCK1. Que T4* 4 Ei/ttnesj Ressner . &i**<o< 
R S :
 Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Utah vs, 
State of Utah, et, al. 
Dear Mike and Dave, 
Enclosed you will find our answers to your second 
set of Requests to Admit and Interrogatories. 
We are aware that your Requests No. 2 and No. 3 are 
asking us to admit statements made by Roger Day in his August 
16, 1978, memo to. Representative Gary Brockbank, a copy of 
which has been provided to you* While we would be willing to' • 
admit that Mr. Day made those statements, we do not feel com-
pelled to admit that his statements reflect accurate legal 
conclusions. Mr. Day is a layman and, of course, is entitled 
to his personal opinions.. However, those opinions are not 
binding upon the real Defendants in* this-case, which are the 
State of Utah, the Insurance Department, and the Tax Commission, 
I am sure you can appreciate our duty to advocate the legal 
pos^.ion of those governmental entities, regardless of whether 
individual state officers and employees express conflicting 
viewpoints. 
Very^truly yours, 
LINDA LUINSTRA 
Assistant Attorney General 
Tax and Business Regulation Div. 
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